This paper examines the views of directors of public listed Australian companies regarding the role of the independent director and the significance of that role in relationship to the composition of the Board of Company Directors (BOCD). The preferred model for board composition in Australian public listed companies is that of a majority of Non-Executive Directors. Whilst this model is promoted in Australia there is conflicting evidence surrounding the claim that a majority of independent members in the board structure contributes to high levels of performance.
Introduction
The article reports qualitative research which examines the perceptions of governance practice held by a group of company directors holding positions on boards of Australian public listed companies between 1997 and 2000. This paper looks at the views of participating directors regarding the role of the independent director and the significance of that role in relationship to the composition of the
Board of Company Directors (BOCD).
The paper is organized as follows. The research objectives and methodology are briefly outlined. A profile of the directors participating in the research is accompanied by a set of descriptions for various types of directors that make up the membership of a BOCD. The remaining sections of the paper are derived from significant categories of interview data that provided the views held by participating directors when discussing the role of the independent director. The significance of the independent director is examined, followed by a discussion that focuses on the ways in which independence is demonstrated on BOCDs. Directors' responsibilities to shareholders and their availability for attending to board duties are also discussed. The final section examines the directors' views on the selection of independent directors.
Quotes from interviews are used throughout the paper. Discussions are based on the views of the participating directors. The convention adopted for acknowledging extracts from interviews (…/) is adhered to throughout the paper.
Research Design
The research was part of a study of 'best practice corporate governance'. The research involved interviews with directors of Australian public listed companies and funds management executives. The following assumptions underpin the study;
• there is no single, universal theory of organisational structure to inform Corporate Governance models (Charkham 1995 );
• models of Corporate Governance adapt to context (Van den Berghe & De Ridder 1999) , and occur within a prevailing legal framework (Wymeersch 1998 );
• Corporate governance operates in a market based economy (Hilmer 1993) .
Methodology
This qualitative study is situated within the constructivist paradigm and used a modified grounded research approach (Glaser and Strauss 1967; Strauss and Corbin 1990; Whiteley 2000) . Forty-five directors of public listed Australian companies and sixteen Australian funds management executives were interviewed. Directors Content analysis, an adaptation of Glaser and Strauss (Glaser and Strauss 1967) based on theoretical rules, was used to establish categories of meaning. Categories of meaning arose from the interview data and from financial press literature collected.
Theoretical sensitivity was developed as a result of comparison of data, allowing for numerous iterations. Principal findings are based on the categories of meaning drawn from the interview data (McCabe 2002) .
Applying the Grounded Research Approach
The research makes use of the generative aspects of Grounded Theory (Glaser and Strauss 1967) , applying both theoretical sampling and content analysis. The iterative process used permits meaning to be arrived at via discovery and emergence such that it is 'provisional, capable of reforming and reshaping as interaction proceeds' (Whiteley 2000 p. 5 ). Turner (1981) and Glaser (1978) argue that 'orthodoxy of approach' should not be imposed on those using grounded theory. Adherence to the guiding principles is, nevertheless, necessary. Whiteley (2000 pp. 6-7) argues that the process of institutionalisation in business settings has laid the basis for conceptualisation to a degree that contaminates the use of pure Grounded Theory (Glaser and Strauss 1967) . However, there is still value in making use of aspects of Grounded Theory (Strauss, 1990; Glaser and Strauss 1967) . Whiteley (2000) proposed a modified grounded research approach as appropriate. The concept of corporate governance has become institutionalised and this research adopts the position that the use of the 
Participating Directors
The preferred model for board composition in Australian public listed companies is that of a majority of Non-Executive Directors (Bosch 1993) . In this model it is also preferred that the Chairperson be an independent director, thus separating the roles of the CEO and the Chair. The shift to the appointment of independent non-executive directors was promoted as the norm in Australia (Hilmer 1993; AIMA 1997; Australian Stock Exchange 1998; Norburn, Boyd, Fox and Murth 2000) as a result of corporate excesses of the nineteen-eighties. Whilst in the United Kingdom the Cadbury Report (Cadbury 1992 ) also promoted a board composition that would include independent directors, the preference was for the role of CEO and Chairperson to be combined.
Demographics of the directors participating in this research (Table 1) 
Types of Directors
A key point of discussion was the need to distinguish between Non-Executive directors (NEDS) who are considered to be independent and NEDs who are not independent. It can usually be expected that a board will include executive directors and non-executive directors (AIMA 1997; Bosch 1995; Hilmer 1993 Figure 1 shows categories of directors that were identified by participating directors along with some key characteristics of each group. The Australian preference for a separation of CEO and Chair (AIMA 1997) does not exclude the likelihood that the roles can at times be combined (Figure 1 ). Where they are not combined, the purpose of the separation is to demonstrate independence for the role of the Chair.
The chairperson should be an independent director or, if the chairperson
is not an independent director, the independent directors should appoint one of their number to be lead director and to report to them on issues falling within the normal purview of a Non-Executive chairperson (AIMA 1997, p. 21) .
History has shown that the intention of the regulators in this regard can be frustrated if the notion of independence is compromised in any way. The restructuring of the BHP board in 1998 saw the removal of both the CEO (Hextall 1998; Durie 1998) and the Chairman (Bolt and Kitney 1998; Flint and Hurst 1998) in an effort to provide a measure of independence to the two roles. Bosch (1993) describes the requirements for independence as not being a substantial shareholder, not being employed in any executive capacity by the company within the last three years, not retained as a professional advisor by the company, not a significant supplier to the company and having no significant contractual relationship with the company other than as a director. Baysinger and Butler (1985) describe these directors as 'outsiders'.
NED and independent?
Company directors interviewed in the study were of the opinion that directors who are 'NEDs and independent' need to demonstrate an independence of mind, independence of knowledge sources and independence of income. …/ exercise absolutely independent judgement …/ stand alone independent thinking …/ encourage them rather than discourage them from getting independent information …/ an independent staff, office, relationships …/ is not dependent on board fees for a substantial part of his income…/ not beholden to it because they are a major supplier to the company…/
NED but not independent
Non-Executives Directors who are not independent were described by Baysinger and Butler (1985) as 'grey area' directors. In an Australian study (Clifford and Evans, 1997) it was found that 35% of the Non-Executive directors in publicly listed companies in the study were in this category. They are former employees, major shareholders or directors holding some other form of contractual relationship with the organisation such as providing goods or services. …/ been on the board for something like twenty years in 1996 [and so] classified as not being independent …/ a director who is a partner in a law firm which is used by the company is not independent …/ a big shareholder has a vested interest in outcomes …/ they should be called Non-Executive directors as distinct from the independent Non-Executive director…/
Executive Director
The Executive Director is either on the board in an executive capacity or in the capacity of Chief Executive Officer (CEO) or the combined role of CEO and Chairman. While executive directors form a traditional category of BOCD members some participating directors viewed having executives as members of the BOCD as problematic.
…/ the senior executive team ought to be in the board meeting as observers …/ it is very difficult for executive directors to contribute as a director…/
Requirements of Independence
Within the board, the role of the independent director has taken on a greater significance in the Australian BOCD since the nineteen-eighties. Participating directors talked about three dimensions that were important in identifying the independent director. Directors should be able to irrefutably demonstrate their independence; they should be responsible to shareholders; and they should be available to devote the time required of the role of an independent director. 
Demonstrating independence
Independence in the relationship with the organisation was an essential feature of demonstrating independence. In addition to Bosch's (1993) requirement of the independent director as having no historical or monetary connection with the company, the question of relationship with the organisation also included the day to day working relationship with the company.
…/ directors generally do not get themselves involved in the nitty-gritty of day to day management …/ Participants considered that providing an independent view in the boardroom assisted directors in maintaining a balance of power within the boardroom with a view to sustaining board management relationships. Because this was important to the overall operation of the board, resulting in benefits to the organisation, it followed that having independent directors on the board was of importance.
…/ providing first of all an independent view …/ stand alone independent thinking …/ there has got to be a good relationship between the board and management…/ understand well the role of the Non-Executive director compared with management…/ do not try to back seat drive management but try to stimulate…/
Relationship with the organisation
The balance required called for maintaining a workable relationship with management and respect for the independence of the director.
…/ act as a check and a balance on the enthusiasms of management…/ capacity to say management is wrong, or the major shareholder is wrong…/ When Justice Rogers (1992) made the observation that within business conglomerates the opportunity for Non-Executive directors to exercise meaningful control over management was extremely slight he highlighted the extent to which management is seen as the embodiment of the corporation. As a social entity (Francis 1997 ) the corporate identity is able to reflect the characteristic features of the management team and its make-up. This view of the firm differs significantly from Jensen and Meckling's (1976 p. 311 ) 'black box' view described as 'legal fiction' serving as a nexus for contracting relationships. Grady (1999) describes the board role in a way that implies that a closer relationship can exist between management and the board than is usually demonstrated on Australian BOCDs. Among directors there were those who saw the traditional separation of board and management as necessary. One participant, holding the role of chairman on a board, held firmly to the idea that boards and management should remain separate.
…/ I also have the responsibility to be the bridge between management and board because I am leading the board…/ Another director held similar views.
…/ once they get interlinked into where management is it will become counter productive…/ These views are consistent with the traditional property model of corporate governance supported by agency theory (Francis 1997) . Finklestein and Hambrick (1996) talk about the monitoring role of the board. Pease and McMillan (1993) talk about the dual roles of the board, describing them as strategic planner/pilot and that of supervisor/monitor. Participants also identified these two roles, …/ divides them into pilot boards and monitoring boards…/ The piloting, monitoring thing is I think, only just one way of looking at it…/ in the past I think that they were all pilot boards…/ the accrediting board could in fact be the piloting board…/ For others the monitoring role was seen to focus on the board's role of ratifying and monitoring the implementation of strategy. Development of strategy was not included in any descriptions of the monitoring role. This suggests that directors saw the monitoring role as consistent with agency theory (Fama and Jensen 1983) , but not extending to the more dynamic model of best practice they promote in the interviews.
…/ their job is to ensure that this Chief Executive that they put in and that they are monitoring against his strategies, is in fact achieving the increments in shareholder wealth that they set out to do, rather than get involved in a really (2000) suggests there is increasing demand for corporations to work towards a future vision rather than be entrenched in precedent and past practices. Stacey (1996) claims it is also necessary to know what is happening and how these things are impacting on the operating environment and anticipating the ways that they need to be adjusted in response.
Independence of income
Associated with demonstrating independence in relationships with the organisation is the requirement that independent directors have an independent source of income.
Whilst the discussion concerning remuneration of independent directors acknowledged that there were many forms in which this can be done, there was a consensus that in the name of independence these directors should not be dependent for their income on any one particular board.
…/ They are not beholden because that is the only source of income that they have …/ independent staff, office, relationships…/
Independence of mind
Whilst independence in the relationship with the organisation was considered an essential, participating directors considered that 'independence of mind' was the most significant requirement.
…/ stand alone independent thinking …/ Although proponents for the inclusion of independent directors on boards have seen this as a way of opening up BOCDs to bring new perspectives to the board table, it has been claimed that most boards, having secured both executive and NonExecutive membership, lack the diverse thinking that is required for challenging management's thinking (Grady 1999, p.10) . In Grady's view this is because most directors are men 'cut from the same cloth'. Leighton, reporting on the structural characteristics of Canadian and U.S boards claims,
It takes a bold and secure director or search firm to put forward the name of a woman, a labour sympathizer, socialist, environmentalist or other outspoken advocate to any board selection committee, and if someone is suggested from 'outside the box', that name usually disappears in the process … (Leighton 2000 p. 258).
Appointing directors that are independent of the organisation does not in itself ensure independence of thought and professional judgement. The differentiating feature for the independent director is that information is freely available to them and able to be supplemented by them from other independent sources of information (Nowak and McCabe, 2003) .
The collapse of the insurance company HIH, in Australia ( sufficient that the board structure provided apparently 'independent' directors. Conger, Finegold and Lawler (1998) propose that the Board of Company Directors (BOCD) become a repository of knowledge and experience that of necessity must match the strategic demands of the company. Pease and McMillan (1993) consider that by ensuring that there are both directors who are Non-Executive and independent and directors who are Non-Executive but not independent, it is possible to sustain a healthy climate of conflicting and diverse thinking on the board, so avoiding the perils of 'group think'. Independence of mind is seen as an essential prerequisite if the intent of the regulatory requirement is to be met.
Independence of information sources
Participating directors also believed that they needed to have confidence that they could request access to internal information and management sources when what they had was deemed to be insufficient. Most participating directors believed that management would give them information if they asked for it but in many cases it would be a case of having to ask for specific information.
…/ if they think that it is inadequate they can always ask for more information or they can ask to come in and have a talk or a proper briefing…/ Directors in this study made a strong case for independent directors having independent means of accessing information.
…/ encourage them rather than discourage them from getting independent information …/ it is a matter of keeping themselves informed …/
The recommendation that all directors have unrestricted access to company documents and that the company fund external sources of information (Governance 1999 ) addresses these concerns and moves the current practice within Australian
BOCDs towards the practices that prevail in the American approach to accessing information. Francis (1997) indicates that more and more Australian directors are turning to outside experts, credit rating agencies, risk analysis and business audit companies in their quest for information when assessing their own organisation.
One participant talking about his lengthy experience with American boards indicated that:
…/ anything that you wanted to do has to go through almost a separate process of due diligence to convince the independent directors that it was fair to the minority shareholders and that often included getting independent legal and independent accounting advice for the independent directors…/ Experiences among participants indicate that this level of independence is not yet a part of the Australian board culture.
…/ (for) a Non-Executive director of an Australian company, it would be extraordinary if he went out and sought independent legal advice because he needed to protect himself in a transaction that the company was involved in…/ If management is the principal supplier of information, the extent of the BOCD's dependence on management contributes to a highly predictive arrangement.
Solutions tend to be those proposed by and sought by management. This has the capacity to restrict the potential for innovation and change. Complex adaptive systems theory defines this situation as simple and linear (Stacey 1996) . Simple linear lines of communication restrict discussion and produce highly predictive outcomes (Griffin, Shaw and Stacey 1998) . If X is the case then Y is expected (Jones 1995) .
The case where information is being accessed freely from within the organisation and also from external sources (Francis 1997) does not fit within the predictive model. A non-linear way of operating is complex and enables dynamic interaction to produce emergent solutions (Griffin, Shaw and Stacey 1998) . This framework allows independent contributions with regard to deliberation and the making of judgements.
In such an environment BOCD members are encouraged to bring innovative and challenging ideas to the board room.
Responsibilities to shareholders
Recognition of the responsibility to shareholders acknowledges shareholders as owners. It implies that there is a focus on shareholder value and accountability that is presented to them that they should have…/
In spite of the large numbers of individual shareholders the implication is that, as a group, their influence is limited. Consultation with the individual shareholder does not figure as a significant dynamic in the development of corporate strategies designed to achieve shareholder value (Useem 1996) .
It is clear that, other than at the Annual General Meeting, only a major shareholder is in a position to wield significant influence. In Australia, the Australian Shareholders Association provides individual, small shareholders with the benefits of a concerted voice, when, as isolated voices, they could easily be overlooked or ignored. However it does not provide them with a voice or voting rights in the board room. In the logic of Agency theory the individual investor, while not having internal voice, does have exit voice and can quit their shares if not satisfied with company performance. The role of the BOCD in a public listed company involves enhancing investor confidence (Bosch 1993; Hilmer 1993; Useem 1996) . The board will only achieve this by producing positive performance results for the organisation. Concentrating on performance activities will normally satisfy the need to focus on shareholder interests. As directors …/ independent directors should not remain on the board of a particular company for too long…/ we have said ten years is ample…/ Directors observed that ensuring that directors were 'able to allocate sufficient time for board duties' was also an important part of protecting the independence of directors.
…/ someone who has the time to put in …/ who will spend enough time to understand the company…/
The number of directorships held by an independent director tends to give credence to the fact that a particular person is of value to a BOCD. Developments within corporate governance legal frameworks have questioned this practice. Mattis (2000) observes that there is a trend for executives and directors to hold fewer directorships due to liability issues. Bringing an informed and independent view to BOCD deliberations requires the independent director to allocate the amount of time required for research and deliberation.
Selecting independent directors
Wallis (2000) and Pollak (2000) discuss the responsibility of the BOCD to appoint directors to the board as well as to select and appoint the CEO. Given the propensity for boards prior to the nineteen-nineties to subscribe to the 'old boys club' strategy for succession planning, or at best an ad hoc basis (Hilmer 1993) , it is understandable why directors gave importance to this. It is clear from the qualitative findings that the 'old boys' club' mentality was something boards wanted to avoid in their succession planning but it was not always clear this could be easily achieved.
…/ business was done on the old boy network…/ there was a little bit of an old boys' club around…/ one of the things that companies do not always do well, I
think, is to be sure that they have got proper succession plans in order…/ There is evidence in the literature that general practice still does not demonstrate all that is aspired to in this regard. Leighton (2000) considers the role of the major shareholder in selection of board members and suggests that pragmatism drives the process.
It is much easier and hassle-free to operate on an ad hoc process built
on an old boys' network, where the board has at most a kind of veto over candidates put forward by the chairman or major shareholder (Leighton 2000 p. 25 ).
Both Leighton (2000) and Grady (1999) are of the opinion that, in spite of the changes with regard to board structures, the trend continues. Those chosen for directorships are more likely to be 'cut from the same cloth' or 'people like us'.
Directors also noted the obvious gender disparity in the composition of boards. They talked about the reasons underpinning the lack of significant numbers of women on BOCDs. Directors considered that experience in executive roles was the definitive factor preventing many women from being included on boards.
…/ there is a lot happening that is causing younger women to gather that experience and they are coming into boards and are very effective and it is easy to recognise the fact that they have got that experience…/ there is some question about how we address that subject because it would possibly be a good idea for us if we could find a way to put women in a position where they can gain that experience without us having to go through another twenty years of the development of women in business…/ Mattis (2000) , in researching the appointment of women to corporate boards in America, examines the four principle findings of a report by an executive search firm (Daum 1999 
Essential qualities for a director
Qualities you don't want Qualities you want
Integrity Inexperience
Directors talked about what they considered to be the essential qualities one looks for when selecting a director (Figure 3 ). While directors claim that they would want to see these qualities in all directors, clearly they are the criteria applied in the selection of independent directors. Derived from: (Charan 1998, pp. 208-209) .
Charan (1998) developed a set of criteria for use in the selection process for the CEO, and proposed that using the same set of criteria throughout the organisation would assist in embedding the leadership qualities sought by the organisation in its corporate genetic code. It is useful to consider the qualities proposed by the participating directors alongside comparative criteria from Charan in Table II . It is apparent that there is considerable consistency between the qualities directors sought in fellow directors and selected criteria from Charan's list for the selection of the CEO.
Conclusion
The jury is still out as to whether or not independence is linked to improved performance (Heracleous 2001; Clifford and Evans 1997; Hermalin and Weisbach 1991) . Directors who were interviewed claimed that the independent director had a role on the board -and that there was potential for this role to be a significant one. At the same time they did not make a claim for independence being a significant influence on sustainable performance.
Some directors considered there were disadvantages associated with the practice of an independent chairman particularly in attaining a competitive edge in the market place. In spite of these differences of opinion the findings show that participating directors supported the notion of independence among directors. They provided information on how that should best be demonstrated, the qualities that enable independence in a director and the support systems to facilitate that independence.
